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Title IX Prohibits Retaliation Against Plaintiff Who
Complains of Sex Discrimination, Even if Plaintiff is
Not Recipient of Original Discriminatory
Treatment: Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education
CIVIL RIGHTS - TITLE IX OF THE EDUCATION AMENDMENTS OF
1972 - PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION - RETALIATION - The Supreme
Court of the United States held that Title IX does encompass a
private cause of action for retaliation as an act of intentional dis-
crimination, even when the plaintiff was not subjected to the
original discriminatory treatment.
Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167 (2005).
Congress enacted Title IX of the Education Amendments of
1972 in an effort to ensure further equality in education.' Title IX
specifically deals with discrimination on the basis of sex, mandat-
ing that "no person ... shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to dis-
crimination under any educational program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance."2 Due to the statute's broad lan-
guage, confusion has arisen over what exactly constitutes dis-
crimination under Title IX, and who may legitimately pursue a
cause of action.3 The Supreme Court recently clarified the scope
and application of Title IX in Jackson v. Birmingham Board of
Education."
Petitioner Roderick Jackson ("Jackson") brought suit against
the School Board of Birmingham, Alabama (the "Board") for viola-
tions of Title IX.5 Specifically, Jackson alleged that the Board vio-
lated Title IX by firing him in a retaliatory manner, after he com-
plained that the girls' basketball team was not receiving equal
funding and access to athletic equipment and facilities.6
1. Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, 524 U.S. 274, 280 (1998).
2. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 280. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2005).
3. Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 544 U.S. 167, 172 (2005).
4. 544 U.S. 167 (2005).




The Birmingham school district employed Jackson for more
than ten years.7 In 1993, Jackson was asked to serve as a physical
education teacher as well as the girls' basketball coach.8 In 1999,
he was transferred to Ensley High School.9 While acting as a
coach at Ensley, Jackson discovered that the girls' team was not
receiving equal funding and access to equipment and field time, as
mandated by Title IX.'° Jackson found performing his job as coach
to be increasingly difficult due to this lack of funding. 1 Beginning
in December 2000, Jackson began complaining to supervisors
about the unequal treatment of the girls' team. 2 His complaints
were ignored, and the situation persisted.13 Shortly after initiat-
ing these complaints, Jackson began to receive negative work
evaluations, and he was removed as the girls' coach in May 2001.4
Even though Jackson retained his position as a physical education
teacher, he lost his supplemental coaching salary. 5
Following his dismissal as the girls' basketball coach, Jackson
filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Alabama, claiming that the Board had violated Title IX by
retaliating against him for protesting the discriminatory treat-
ment. 6 Jackson argued that Title IX does recognize a cause of
action for retaliation. 17 The Board responded by filing a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, asserting that the plaintiff
lacked standing under Title IX, and arguing that the claim was
preempted by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 8 The district court
agreed and adopted the chief magistrate's recommendation that
Title IX does not encompass a cause of action for retaliation; ac-
cordingly, the district court granted the motion to dismiss."9 In
reaching this conclusion, the court relied on Holt v. Lewis.2" Citing









15. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172.
16. Id.'
17. Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, No. CV-01-TMP-1866-S, 2002 WL
32668124, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 25, 2002).
18. Jackson, 2002 WL 32668124, at *1.
19. Id. at *2.
20. 955 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Al. 1995).
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Jackson did not, in fact, have standing under Title IX, as he was
neither the recipient of the original discrimination nor a member
of the protected class.21 Finally, the court, relying on Lowery v.
Texas A & M University System,22 found that Jackson's claim
should rest exclusively under Title VII, as an employment dis-
crimination claim, and not as a Title IX discrimination claim.22
Jackson appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit.
24
The court of appeals reviewed the district court's decision de
novo, focusing specifically on whether "Title IX implies a private
right of action in favor of individuals, who, although not them-
selves the victims of gender discrimination, suffer retaliation be-
cause they have complained about gender discrimination suffered
by others."25 The Eleventh Circuit, basing its analysis heavily on
Alexander v. Sandoval,2" concluded that it could "discern no con-
gressional intent in Title IX to create by implication such a private
cause of action," and affirmed the dismissal of Jackson's com-
plaint.27
The Supreme Court granted certiorari2" to "resolve a conflict in
the Circuits over whether Title IX's private right of action encom-
passes claims of retaliation for complaints about sex discrimina-
tion. 29
Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion for the closely di-
vided Court.3" As Jackson's claim was dismissed for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted,31 the Court as-
sumed all material facts as alleged in the complaint as true.2
21. Jackson, 2002 WL 32668124, at *2.
22. 117 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1997).
23. Jackson, 2002 WL 32668124, at *2.
24. Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education, 309 F.3d 1333 (11th Cir. 2002).
25. Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1334.
26. 532 U.S. 275 (2001).
27. Jackson, 309 F.3d at 1335.
28. Certiorari is "[an extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion,
directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 220 (7th ed. 1999).
29. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 172.
30. The majority opinion included Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsberg, and Breyer. Id.
at 169. Justice Thomas wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices Scalia and Kennedy joined. Id.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
32. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 170-71 (citing Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322,
325 (1991)).
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Part II, Subpart A33 of the opinion addressed the nature of Title IX
generally, and provided an overview of the Court's past treatment
and interpretation of Title IX claims.34
Justice O'Connor noted the general intentions of Title IX, 35 and
further clarified the Court's past applications.36 In all of the past
cases, the Supreme Court relied on the broadness of Title IX it-
self.37 The Court further relied on the wording of Title IX in decid-
ing the issue of whether the retaliation experienced by Jackson is
"a form of intentional sex discrimination encompassed by Title
IX's private cause of action."' The majority resolved this issue in
favor of Jackson. 9
According to the Court, "retaliation is, by definition, an inten-
tional act. It is a form of 'discrimination' because the complainant
is being subjected to differential treatment." ° The majority also
held that the retaliation against Jackson did fall under Title IX's
"discrimination on the basis of sex,"' because it was an intentional
response to the nature of the complaint made to the school offi-
cials, which was one of sex discrimination against the girls's
team.42 The Supreme Court decided that the court of appeals' con-
clusion regarding this issue was therefore erroneous.43 As Justice
O'Connor explained, concluding that Title IX does not prohibit
33. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173. Part I of the opinion includes a recitation of the facts and
procedural history of Jackson's case. Id. at 171-72.
34. Id. at 173.
35. Justice O'Connor explained:
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination by recipients of federal education funding.
The statute provides that "no person in the United States, shall, on the basis of
sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal fi-
nancial assistance."
Id. at 172-73. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
36. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173. "Title IX implies a private right of action to enforce its
prohibition on intentional sex discrimination." Id. (citing Canon v. University of Chicago,
441 U.S. 677, 690-93 (1979)). Title IX also "authorizes private parties to seek monetary
damages for intentional violations..." Id. at 173 (citing Franklin v. Gwinnet County Pub-
lic Schools, 503 U.S. 60 (1992)). "The private right of action encompasses intentional dis-
crimination in the form of a recipient's deliberate indifference to a teacher's sexual harass-
ment of a student, or to sexual harassment of a student by another student." Id. at 1504
(citing Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (1998), and Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629
(1999)).




41. Id. at 173.
42. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 173.
43. Id.
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retaliation merely because the statute makes no mention of it "ig-
nores the import of our repeated holdings construing 'discrimina-
tion' under Title IX broadly."'
The majority noted that Title IX was enacted in 1972, shortly
after the Court's ruling in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc.45
Sullivan arose as an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1982,46 and the
Court held that a prohibition on racial discrimination covered re-
taliation against non-class members who advocated for the pro-
tected class.47 The Court stated that Congress would have had
familiarity with the ruling in Sullivan and would have expected
Title IX to be interpreted in conformity with it. 48 Therefore, Con-
gress' failure to specifically list "retaliation" as a form of discrimi-
nation in Title IX should not be interpreted to mean Congress ex-
cluded "retaliation" as a form of discrimination; indeed, the stat-
ute itself is intentionally broad.49
In Subpart B of Part II,50 Justice O'Connor corrected the Board's
misinterpretation of Alexander v. Sandoval."1 The Board con-
tended that Sandoval compels a holding that there is no right of
action for retaliation in Title IX.52 Sandoval involved a Title V153
interpretation,54 and the Court ultimately reiterated its previous
44. Id. Justice O'Connor maintained that "'Discrimination' is a term that covers a wide
range of intentional and unequal treatment; by using such a broad term, Congress gave the
statute a broad reach." Id. The Court further clarified that Title IX, is not Title VII, stat-
ing they are "vastly different." Id. The Board urged the Court to draw comparisons be-
tween Title IX and Title VII; however, the majority determined that this comparison was
improper and of little use. Id.
45. 396 U.S. 229 (1969).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2005). 42 U.S.C. § 1982 provides in relevant part that "[a]ll citi-
zens of the United States shall have the same right.., as is enjoyed by white citizens ... to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and personal property." Jackson, 125 S.
Ct. at 1504. The Court in Sullivan interpreted this statute to protect a white man who
spoke out against discrimination toward a black tenant and suffered retaliation as a result.
Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1504.
47. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 176.
48. Id. See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
49. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 175.
50. Id. at 177.
51. Id. (discussing Sandoval, 523 U.S. 275 (2001)).
52. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 167.
53. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d) (2005). Title VI provides in relevant part that no person shall,
,on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity." Id.
54. Sandoval dealt with a disparate impact claim. Sandoval, 523 U.S. at 275, 282.
Disparate impact refers to the "adverse effect of a facially neutral practice (esp an employ-
ment practice) that nonetheless discriminates against persons because of their race, sex,
national origin, age, or disability. Discriminatory intent is irrelevant in a disparate-impact
claim." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 381 (7th ed. 1999). As Title VI is meant to prohibit in-
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holding that "a private plaintiff may not bring [a suit based on a
regulation] against a defendant for acts not prohibited by the text
[of the statute]."' The Board contended that Jackson, like the
plaintiffs in Sandoval, was attempting to impermissibly extend
Title IX by arguing that its private cause of action encompasses
retaliation." Although the Board cited a Department of Education
regulation that prohibited retaliation against an individual for the
purpose of interfering with a right or privilege secured by Title IX,
the majority clearly stated it was unnecessary to consider or rely
on this regulation.57 Title IX itself contains the necessary prohibi-
tion, as explained in Subpart A of Part 11.58 According to the
Court, Jackson's claim was, in fact, consistent with Sandoval be-
cause a claim for retaliation falls within Title IX's prohibition of
intentional discrimination on the basis of sex.59
In Subpart C of Part II, the Court turned to an examination of
the Board's argument that Jackson was not entitled to protection
under Title IX because he is an "indirect victim" of sex discrimina-
tion. ° The majority found this argument to be unconvincing.6'
Relying again on the broad wording of Title IX, the Court main-
tained that there is no requirement that "the victim of the retalia-
tion must also be the victim of the discrimination that is the sub-
ject of the original complaint."62 Rather, where the retaliation oc-
curs merely because the complainant speaks out against discrimi-
nation, the requirements of the statute are satisfied.63 Such an
interpretation is consistent with the Court's holding in Sullivan,
which made clear that retaliation claims extend to those who op-
pose discrimination against others.64
Furthermore, a narrow construction of Title IX would frustrate
the purpose of the statute itself.6" Justice O'Connor explained that
tentional discrimination, respondents' claims in Sandoval were denied. Jackson, 544 U.S.
at 177 (citing Sandoval, 523 U.S. at 285).
55. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 178 (citing Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver, 511 U.S. 164, 173 (1994)).
56. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 178.
57. Id. In fact, the Court stated that "[tihis argument, however, entirely misses the
point." Id. at 177.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 179.
61. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 179.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 237).
65. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 180.
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Title IX was not meant not only to prevent the use of federal dol-
lars to support discrimination but also to provide citizens with
judicial and legislative protection against discriminatory prac-
tices.6" The Court agreed with the United States' argument in its
Amicus Curiae brief that achieving both objectives would be "diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to achieve if persons who complained about
sex discrimination did not have effective protection against re-
taliation."' Justice O'Connor further agreed that enforcement of
Title IX depends on reports of violations.68 By offering legal pro-
tection to would-be reporters, individuals would be encouraged to
come forward with their claims of discrimination, further promot-
ing the goals of Title IX.69 For these reasons, Justice O'Connor
rejected the Board's second argument."
The Court dealt with the Board's final argument in Subpart D of
Part 11.71 The Board contended that, as Title IX was enacted as an
exercise of congressional power under the Spending Clause, dam-
ages actions are available only when the recipients of the federal
funding had adequate notice of their liability for the conduct at
issue. 2 The Board therefore argued that the Court should not in-
terpret Title IX to prohibit retaliation because it lacked notice of
liability for such retaliation." While the majority agreed with the
Board's premise, the Court determined that the Board did have
notice." The Court's decisions regarding Title IX since Cannon v.
University of Chicago75 have provided notice that recipients could
be subjected to private suits for retaliation.76 The Court main-
tained that it has consistently interpreted Title IX's private cause
of action broadly.77 The majority concluded that "retaliation
against individuals because they complain of sex discrimination is
'intentional conduct that violates the clear terms of the statute,'
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Petitioner,
2004 WL 1062111, at *6 (2004)).
68. Jackson 544 U.S. at 180.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 181.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 181-82
73. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 181-82.
74. Id.
75. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
76. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 182. See also Davis, 526 U.S. 629 (1999); Gebser, 524 U.S.
274 (1998); Franklin, 503 U.S. 60 (1992); Bennet v. Kentucky Dept. of Ed., 470 U.S. 656
(1985); Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
77. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 183.
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and that Title IX itself therefore supplied sufficient notice to the
Board."
78
Justice O'Connor concluded the majority opinion by noting that,
in order to prevail on the merits, Jackson will have to prove that
the retaliation occurred because he complained of sex discrimina-
tion. 79 The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit was reversed, and the case remanded."
Justice Thomas, with whom Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justices
Scalia and Kennedy joined, filed a dissenting opinion.81 Justice
Thomas believed the majority's holding to be contrary to the plain
terms of Title IX and asserted that retaliatory conduct is not dis-
crimination on the basis of sex." Justice Thomas explained that
"retaliation is not based on anyone's sex, much less the complain-
ant's sex," thus Jackson could not have a proper cause of action
under Title IX. The dissent further disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of Sullivan, considering the holding to be much
more narrow, and argued that other related Title IX cases did not
offer notice to the Board. 4 Justice Thomas concluded by stating
that the language of Title IX does not support the majority's hold-
ing, and noted that,
[ulnder the majority's reasoning, courts may expand li-
ability as they, rather than Congress, see fit. This is no
idle worry. . . the question before us is only whether Title
IX prohibits retaliation, not whether prohibiting it is good
policy... I would hold that [Title IX] does not encompass
private actions for retaliation.85
Determining which causes of action are encompassed by Title IX
has been a recurring issue for the Supreme Court.86 Of particular
concern has been deciding whether or not a private cause of action
was implicitly created by the statute,87 as the broad language con-
78. Id. at 183 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 642).
79. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 184.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 184 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
82. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 184. (Thomas, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 185.
84. Id. at 191-92.
85. Id. at 195.
86. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275; Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274; Franklin,
503 U.S. 60; North Haven, 456 U.S. 512; Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
87. Cannon is the seminal Title IX case in which the Supreme Court held that Title IX
did in fact implicitly contain a private cause of action. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
Vol. 44752
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tained few express provisions.88 The Supreme Court has histori-
cally used this broadness to define and expand the causes of action
encompassed by Title IX and ensure its enforcement.89
Interpretations of Title IX have often rested on a case which
was decided before Title IX was even enacted.9" In 1969, Supreme
Court held, in Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, that retaliation for
advocacy on behalf of a black lessee, even though petitioner was
white, constituted discrimination on the basis of race under 42
U.S.C. § 1982.91
At issue in Sullivan was whether or not a white citizen had
standing to advocate for the rights of an African-American citizen
under 42 U.S.C. § 1982, and if such advocacy resulted in retalia-
tion, whether the white citizen had a separate cause of action for
such retaliation.92 In reaching its conclusion, the Court looked to
the language of the statute itself, and its previous ruling in Bar-
rows v. Jackson.93 The majority first held that a narrow construc-
tion of the statute would be inconsistent with the "broad and
sweeping nature of the protection meant to be afforded" by the
statute.94 From this holding, the Court declared that punishing
Sullivan for "trying to vindicate the rights of minorities protected
by § 1982" would only perpetuate the racial restrictions the stat-
88. Jackson, 544 U.S. 167. "Title IX is a broadly written general prohibition on dis-
crimination, followed by specific, narrow exceptions to that broad prohibition." Id. at 175.
89. See Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275; Davis, 526 U.S. 629; Gebser, 524 U.S. 274; Franklin,
503 U.S. 60; North Haven, 456 U.S. 512; Cannon, 441 U.S. 677.
90. Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969). Sullivan was a white
homeowner who owned a house in Little Hunting Park, Inc., located in Fairfax, Virginia.
Id. at 235. Little Hunting Park was a nonstock corporation which organized a community
park and playground for the benefit of its residents. Id. A share in Little Hunting Park
entitled the shareholder and shareholder's immediate family to use those recreational
facilities. Id. The bylaws of the corporation allowed a person who owned a share to assign
that share to a tenant if the shareholder rented his house. Id. Such assignment was sub-
ject to the approval of the board of directors. Id. Sullivan wished to assign his share to his
tenant, Mr. Freeman, an African-American. Id. The board refused this assignment due to
Mr. Freeman's race. Id. When Mr. Sullivan protested the board's actions, he was notified
that he would be expelled if he continued to protest. Id. Both Sullivan and Freeman
brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1982. Id. While it was not questioned that Freeman had
standing, Little Hunting Park argued that Sullivan, as a white homeowner, did not have a
cause of action under the statute. Id. at 237.
91. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 235-36. Section 1982 provides, in relevant part, that "[aill
citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and Territory, as is
enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold and convey real and
personal property." Id. at 235 n.3; see 42 U.S.C. § 1982.
92. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 236.
93. Id. at 236 (citing Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953) (holding that the white
owner may be the only effective adversary of unlawful restrictive covenants)).
94. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 236.
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ute sought to eliminate; therefore, "there can be no question but
that Sullivan has standing to maintain this action."95
While the above detailed cases provide a background for inter-
pretation of Title IX, the seminal case in the judicial history of
Title IX is Cannon v. University of Chicago, in which the Supreme
Court determined that Title IX did imply a private cause of ac-
tion.96 Petitioner Geraldine Cannon alleged that, despite her
qualifications, she was denied admittance to medical school.97 Al-
though the medical schools she applied to had a policy disfavoring
candidates over the age of thirty (petitioner was thirty-nine),
Cannon argued that, as women are much more likely than men to
have interrupted education and thus be older at the time they
pursue advanced degrees, such policies were discrimination on the
basis of sex.99 Cannon further alleged that she was not even asked
to complete interviews at these schools, which admitted lesser-
qualified applicants.99 Additionally, the schools received federal
funding.'00 Based on these facts, Cannon filed a private cause of
action for violation of Title IX.'
The respondents argued that the lower courts had correctly helt
that Title IX did not expressly authorize a private right of action
by a person injured by its violation, that no cause of action should
be inferred, and that, therefore, Cannon failed to state a cogniza-
ble claim under Title IX. °2 Thus, the fundamental issue of
whether Title IX contained implied a private right of action for an
injured person was squarely presented to the Court."3 Writing for
the majority, Justice Stevens held that there a person injured by a
violation of Title XI has an implied private cause of action under
the statute.'
In arriving at its holding, the Court employed a four step analy-
sis to the question of statutory construction.' 5  Determining
whether any private remedy is implicit in a statue which does not
expressly provide one rests on four main factors: (1) whether the
95. Id.
96. Cannon, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).




101. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 680.
102. Id. at 683.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 699.
105. Id. at 688.
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plaintiff is part of the class for whose particular benefit the stat-
ute was enacted; (2) whether there is any indication of legislative
intent to create or deny such a remedy; (3) whether the remedy is
consistent with the purpose of the legislative scheme; and (4)
whether the cause of action is one usually relegated to state law in
an area of state concern, making a federal remedy inappropriate.' °6
In evaluating the first factor, Justice Stevens maintained that
earlier cases, which had "recognized the propriety of inferring a
federal cause of action for the enforcement of civil rights, even
when Congress has spoken in purely declarative terms" were di-
rectly applicable to an analysis of Title IX.1' "[A] statute declara-
tive of a civil right will almost have to be stated in terms of the
benefited class . .. [Tihe right to be free of discrimination is a 'per-
sonal' one," therefore the statute will have to be "phrased in terms
of the persons benefited.""8 Title IX, the majority held, is such a
statute, and Cannon was clearly of the class meant to be bene-
fited.'0 9
In considering the legislative history of Title IX, the majority in
Cannon recognized that a statute that neither expressly creates
nor denies a private remedy is likely to have a legislative history
that is equally as silent on the topic."0  The Court explained that
in such situations, the absence of an intention to create such a
private cause of action is not necessary for finding such a casue-
cause of action; rather, an explicit intention to deny such a cause
of action is controlling."'
Title IX was modeled after Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, using
nearly identical language to describe the benefited class, and the
drafters assumed that it would be interpreted and applied as Title
VI"' In Cannon, Justice Stevens reiterated that, in 1972, Title VI
had already been interpreted as providing a private remedy."3 As
106. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 689 n.9 (citing Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour,
421 U.S. 412 (1975); National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n. of Railroad Pas-
sengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974); Wheedlin v. Wheeleer, 373 U.S. 647 (1963); Texas & Pacific
R.R. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916)).
107. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693 (citing Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 61 (1978)).
108. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 693.
109. Id. at 694. "Title IX explicitly confers a benefit on persons discriminated against on
the basis of sex, and petitioner is clearly a member of that class for whose special benefit
the statute was enacted." Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 684.
112. Id. at 694-95.
113. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 695. "The same [enforcement] procedure that was set up and
has operated with great success under the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and the regulations
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Title IX was meant to follow Title VI, it is only reasonable, the
Court stated, to assume that the drafters were aware of Title VI's
interpretation and intended Title IX to mirror it."1 4 Moreover, the
Court observed that the holding in Sullivan provided further sup-
port for the belief that Congress was aware of, and approved of,
the Court's construction of an implied private cause of action in
the several civil rights statutes."' Regardless of any presump-
tions, the Court noted that the "package of statutes of which Title
IX is one part also contains a provision whose language and his-
tory demonstrate that Congress itself understood Title VI, and
thus its companion, Title IX, as creating a private remedy."1
6
Thus, a clear legislative intent that a private cause of action exists
in Title IX was present." '
Closely related to discerning legislative intent is the determina-
tion of whether the private remedy would "frustrate the underly-
ing purpose of the legislative scheme."" 8 Title IX was enacted to
"avoid the use of federal resources to support discriminatory prac-
tices" and "to provide individual citizens effective protection
against those practices.""' 9 Justice Stevens explained that serving
the first purpose of Title IX may often result in the termination of
all federal financial support for institutions that engaged in pro-
hibited practices."2  That remedy, the majority stated, "is ... se-
vere and often may not provide an appropriate means of accom-
plishing the second purpose if merely an isolated violation has
occurred." 2' Clearly, the Court noted, the violation would be more
efficiently remedied by ordering an institution to accept an indi-
thereunder[,] would be equally applicable to discrimination [prohibited by Title IX]." Id.
(citing 117 CONG. REc. 30408 (1971) (Sen. Bayh)). Justice Stevens then refers to the 1967
case of Bossier Parish School Board v. Lemon, 370 F.2d 847 (5th Cir. 1967), which
"squarely decided this issue [the presence of a private remedy in Title VI] in an opinion
that was repeatedly cited with approval and never questioned." Id.
114. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 697-98.
115. Id. at 699.
116. Id. "Section 718 of the Education Amendments authorizes federal courts to award
attorney's fees to the prevailing parties, other than the United States, in private actions
brought against public educational agencies to enforce Title VI in the education context."
Id. See also 20 U.S.C. § 1617 (2005) (repealed). Such language "explicitly presumes the
availability of private suits to enforce Title VI." Cannon, 441 U.S. at 699.
117. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 703. "We have no doubt that Congress intended to create Title
IX remedies comparable to those available under Title VI and that it understood Title VI as
authorizing an implied private cause of action." Id.
118. Id. at 703.
119. Id. at 704.
120. Id. at 704-05.
121. Id. at 705.
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vidual who has been improperly excluded.'22 In such an instance,
the "award of individual relief to a private litigant who has prose-
cuted her own suit is not only sensible but is also fully consistent
with and in some cases even necessary to the orderly enforcement
of the statute."23
The majority finally noted that the fourth inquiry as to the
statutory construction of Title IX relates to whether implying a
federal remedy is inappropriate because the subject area involves
a matter of predominantly state concern. 124 The Court noted such
a problem was not present in Cannon: since the Civil War, the
federal government and federal courts have been the primary
means of protecting citizens against discrimination, and Title IX
involves the expenditure of federal funds to justify its particular
prohibitions. 12'
In concluding, the Cannon Court definitively identified a private
right of action to Title IX:
In sum, there is no need in this case to weigh the four.
factors; all of them support the same result. Not only the
words and history of Title IX, but also its subject matter
and underlying purposes, counsel implication of a cause
of action in favor of private victims of discrimination.'6
While the Cannon Court answered the most pivotal question re-
garding enforcement and interpretation of Title IX, future cases
were necessary to further clarify the statute's scope. 2 ' In the 1982
decision of North Haven Board of Education v. Bell, 2 ' the Court
122. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 705.
123. Id. at 705-06. The Court stated:
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, which is charged with the
responsibility for administering Title IX, perceives no inconsistency between
the private remedy and the public remedy. On the contrary, the agency takes
the unequivocal position that the individual remedy will provide effective assis-
tance to achieving the statutory purpose. The agency's position is unques-
tionably correct.
Id. at 706-07.
124. Id. at 708.
125. Id. at 709.
126. Id.
127. See, e.g., Gebser, 524 U.S. 275 (1998); Franklin, 503 U.S. 60 (1992); North Haven,
456 U.S. 512 (1982).
128. 456 U.S. 512 (1982). North Haven comprised two cases, the North Haven case, and
the Trumbull case. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 517-18. Both Boards of Education received
federal funding for education programs. Id. In the North Haven case, Elaine Dove, a ten-
ured teacher, filed a complaint with the Department of Health, Education and Welfare
(HEW) when the school refused to re-hire her after one-year maternity leave. Id. at 517.
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held that the language of Title IX prohibited employment dis-
crimination.129 At issue in North Haven was the validity of regula-
tions promulgated by the Department of Education pursuant to
Title IX, which prohibited federally funded education programs
from discriminating on the basis of gender as to employment.'
Justice Blackmun's analysis began with the statutory language
of Title IX itself."'3 The majority viewed § 901(a) as a "broad direc-
tive."32 Under that provision, employees, like other "persons,"
cannot be "'excluded from participation in,' 'denied the benefits of,'
or 'subjected to discrimination under' education programs receiv-
ing federal financial support."' ' Therefore, employees who di-
rectly participate in federal programs or directly benefit from fed-
eral moneys fall within the protective categories of § 901(a).'
1
Like previous analyses, the North Haven Court maintained that
Title IX's origins indicated a broad scope and that the statute
must be "accord[ed] a sweep as broad as its language." 35 Title IX
"neither expressly nor impliedly excludes employees from its
reach," and therefore "person" should be interpreted in the broad-
est sense of the word.1
3 6
The Court also found the legislative history of the statue sup-
portive of this analysis; the legislative history clearly indicates
Linda Potz, an employee of the Trumbull Board, filed a complaint alleging that the Board
had discriminated against her on the basis of gender, specifically with respect to job as-
signments, working conditions, and failure to renew her contract. Id. at 518. As to both
complaints, HEW believed that Title IX violations had occurred. Id. North Haven brought
suit in District Court to seek a declaratory judgment that the regulations HEW relied on
exceeded the authority conferred by Title IL Id. at 518. The District Court for Connecticut
held that Title IX was not intended to apply to employment practices. Id. When the Trum-
bull Board filed suit seeking the same relief, it was granted based on the decision in the
original North Haven case. Id. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed these deci-
sions, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflicts. Id. at 519.
129. Id. at 520. As amended, Title IX contains two core provisions. Id. The first, Sec-
tion 901(a) provides that "[o person in the United States, shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." Id. at 514.
See also § 901(a), 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). Section 902 relates to enforcement, authorizing each
agency awarding federal assistance to an education program to promulgate regulations to
ensure compliance. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 514. The Department of Education, pursu-
ant to its authority under § 902, promulgated regulations relating to discrimination in
employment, and these are the contested regulations. Id. at 514.
130. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 514.




135. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 521.
136. Id.
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that, even though "employee" was not expressly used in the lan-
guage, Title IX was meant to protect all persons from discrimina-
tion in education.'37 As Senator Bayh stated during congressional
debate of Title IX, "the heart of this amendment is a provision
banning sex discrimination in educational programs receiving
Federal funds. The amendment would cover such crucial aspects
as . . . faculty employment."' This examination of the statue it-
self and the legislative intent behind it led the Court to conclude
that "leImployment discrimination comes within the prohibition of
Title IX."
139
After the initial interpretation of Title IX found in Cannon and
North Haven, the Franklin and Gebser Courts further interpreted
Title IX as to the issues of monetary damages and employer liabil-
ity.
140
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools was the first time
the Supreme Court confirmed that damages were available for an
action brought to enforce Title IX.1  Petitioner Christine Franklin
was a student in Gwinnett County, and the school district received
and used federal funds.' While a student in high school, Frank-
lin was subjected to continual sexual harassment by Andrew Hill,
a sports coach and teacher employed by the school.' As Franklin
was no longer a student when the suit was filed, she sought mone-
tary damages from Gwinnett County Public Schools under Title
IX.'
4 4
Justice White stated that the "case present [ed] the question
whether the implied right of action under Title IX.. . supports a
claim for monetary damages." 45 Franklin did not ask the Court to
re-examine its decision in Cannon, but rather to determine which
remedies are available in a suit brought pursuant to an implied
146private cause of action. While a court may "examine the text
137. Id.
138. Id. at 524 (citing 118 CONG. REC. 5803 (1972) (Sen. Bayh)).
139. North Haven, 456 U.S. at 536.
140. See Gebser, 524 U.S. 274; Franklin, 503 U.S. 60; North haven, 456 U.S. 512; Can-
non, 441 U.S. 60.
141. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
142. Id. at 63.
143. Id. Franklin also alleged that she was subject to coercive sexual intercourse on
school property by Hill, and that although the school did become aware ofI Hill's conduct
and investigated his treatment of her, the school did nothing the stop his larassment and
discouraged Franklin from pressing charges. Id. at 63-64.
144. Id. at 76.
145. Id. at 62-63.
146. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 65-66.
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and history of a statute to determine whether Congress intended
to create a right of action," the Court "presume[s] the availability
of all appropriate remedies unless Congress has expressly indi-
cated otherwise.' 47 In adhering to the general rule that "federal
courts may use any' available remedy to make good the wrong
done," the Court held that violations of Title IX could be remedied
through an award of monetary damages. 4 '
The Court noted that the right to a private cause of action under
Title IX is a judicially inferred one, and as such, recourse to statu-
tory text or legislative history is not necessarily helpful. 4 9 Thus,
the majority evaluated the state of the law when Title IX was
passed, during which time the country followed a "common law
tradition [and] regarded the denial of a remedy as an exception
rather than the rule.""' Further, the Supreme Court had found
implied rights of action in six cases, and approved a damages rem-
edy in three of those cases even before Cannon held that a private
right of action existed in Title IX. The majority maintained that
this state of the law indicated the lack of "any legislative intent to
abandon the traditional presumption in favor of all available
remedies."" 2 After Cannon's announcement, Justice White noted,
it is possible to employ a more traditional method of statutory
analysis.' The Court looked to the two amendments to Title IX
which followed Cannon."'4  Neither of these led the majority to
conclude that Congress ever intended to limit the remedies avail-
able under Title IX.155
Although Gwinnett County argued that a damages award would
violate separation of powers principles by expanding the federal
courts' powers into the legislative and executive spheres, the
Court was unconvinced."' The majority stated that the respon-
147. Id. at 66 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1979)).
148. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 76.
149. Id. at 71.
150. Id. (citing Merrill Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 378 (1982)).
151. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 72.
152. Id.
153. Id. A more traditional statutory analysis is possible because Congress was legislat-
ing with complete cognizance of the Court's decision in Cannon. Id.
154. Id. The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 abrogated the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity under Title IX, and the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 broad-
ened the coverage of antidiscrimination provisions in Title IX and other statutes. Id. at 72.
Neither can be read except as a validation of Cannon. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-
7(a)(2) (2005), and 102 Stat. 28.
155. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 73.
156. Id. at 73-74.
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dents "misconceive[d] the difference between a cause of action and
a remedy. Unlike the finding of a cause of action, which author-
izes a court to hear a case or controversy, the discretion to
award.., relief involves no. . . increase in judicial power."157 The
Court further recognized that, as the case was one of intentional
discrimination, no notice problem arose; thus, the remedy is not
limited, as is the case in unintentional violations. 11 The Court
concluded that "a damages remedy is available for an action
brought to enforce Title IX."19
Franklin also indicated that sexual harassment of a student by
a teacher would fall under the prohibitions of Title IX, 6 ' and in the
Franklin case, it was clear that the school had notice of such har-
assment.16' The Gebser Court set out various guidelines of how
courts should treat cases like Franklin when no notice was pre-
sent. 162
In Gebser, Alida Gebser joined a book club run by a high school
teacher, Frank Waldrop. 6' During club meetings, Waldrop made
sexually suggestive comments, and Gebser alleged that when she
entered high school, Waldrop initiated sexual contact."' Gebser
and Waldrop had sexual intercourse during the school year.1
6 5
Gebser never reported her encounters with Waldrop to any school
officials. 66 While parents of other students later complained about
suggestive comments made by Waldrop, the school did not take
extensive disciplinary action against him."' Later during the
school year, a police officer discovered Waldrop and Gebser engag-
ing in intercourse; Waldrop was arrested, and the school then
terminated him. 66 Gebser then filed suit against the Lago Vista
School District as well as Waldrop.'69 It was her claim against
Lago Vista, arising under Title IX, which was of primary con-
170cern.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 74.
159. Id. at 76.
160. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 281.
161. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 74.
162. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 284-88, 290.
163. Id. at 277.
164. Id. at 278.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 278.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 278-79.
170. Id. at 279.
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Gebser focused on the school district's liability for damages un-
der Title -X's implied right of action when the claims involved
sexual harassment of a student by a teacher. 171 The Court held
that damages may not be recovered "unless an official of the school
district who at a minimum has authority. to institute corrective
measures on the district's behalf has actual notice of, and is delib-
erately indifferent to, the teacher's misconduct.",' 2
The majority had no desire to disturb the holding in Franklin,
but merely defined the contours of liability under Franklin.7' The
petitioners advanced two standards for imposing liability on the
Lago Vista School District.174  The first was an expression of re-
spondeat superior, 7' "under which recovery in damages against a
school district would generally follow whenever a teacher's author-
ity over a student facilitates the harassment."'76 The second the-
ory submitted by the petitioners was one of constructive notice, 
77
"where the district knew or should have known about harassment
but failed to uncover and eliminate it." 78  The petitioners cited
favorable cases that interpreted Title VII to allow recovery under
such tort theories.'79 However, the Court noted that Title VII
makes explicit mention of "agent" and deals primarily with em-
ployer/employee relationships. 8 ° "Title IX contains no comparable
references to educational institutions' 'agents,' and so does not
expressly call for application of agency principles."8 ' However, the
majority Justices were most troubled by petitioners' wish to re-
cover damages based on theories of respondeat superior and con-
structive notice.
182
171. Id. at 277.
172. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 277.
173. Id. at 281.
174. Id. at 281-82.
175. Respondeat superior is "[the doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the
employee's or agent's wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or
agency." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1053 (7th ed. 1999).
176. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 282.
177. Constructive notice is "[n]otice [of some fact or event] arising by presumption of law
from the existence of facts and circumstances that a party had a duty to take notice of,...
[or] notice presumed by law to have been acquired by a person and thus imputed to that
person." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 870 (7th ed. 1999).
178. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 281-82.
179. Id. at 283. Petitioner cited Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2005).
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Title VII contains an express cause of action, and specifically
provides for relief in the form of monetary damages."3 The Court
found clear congressional intent to not only apply agency law, but
also to address damages directly in finding relief under Title VII."
Title IX contains no express provisions; instead, the private right
of action and monetary damages relief are judicially implied.'85
Therefore, the Court has a "measure of latitude to shape a sensi-
ble remedial scheme that best comports with the statute. To guide
the analysis, we generally examine the relevant statute to ensure
that we do not fashion the scope of an implied right in a manner at
odds with the statutory structure and purpose."86
In this instance, the Court determined that it would frustrate
the purposes of Title IX to permit a damages recovery against a
school district for a teacher's sexual harassment under theories of
respondeat superior or constructive notice.'87 The majority main-
tained that the Court's role is to "attempt to infer how Congress
would have addressed the issue."'88 The Court concluded that "[als
a general matter, it does not appear that Congress contemplated
unlimited recovery in damages against a funding recipient where
the recipient is unaware of discrimination in its programs."'89
Title IX focuses on protecting the individual from discriminatory
practices carried out by the recipients of federal funding. 9 ° The
majority maintained that it is contractual in nature, and this na-
ture, coupled with its express means of enforcement by adminis-
trative agencies "operates on an assumption of actual notice to
officials of the funding recipient."9 ' The Court stated that viola-
tors are required to take remedial action in an effort to ameliorate
the effects of the discrimination.' 2 However, Justice O'Connor
wrote that this requirement does not seem to contemplate a condi-
tion ordering relief in the form of monetary damages, and pay-
ment is not a condition of compliance.9 Notice of the violation to
an appropriate official and an opportunity to voluntarily comply
183. Id. at 283-84. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (express cause of action), and § 1981a
(setting out monetary damages).
184. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 283-84.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 284.
187. Id. at 285.
188. Id.
189. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285.
190. Id. at 286.
191. Id. at 286-87.
192. Id. at 288.
193. Id. at 288-89.
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with the statue before enforcement proceedings commence is
meant to avoid "diverting education funding from beneficial uses
where a recipient was unaware of discrimination in its programs
and is willing to institute prompt corrective measures."'94 Con-
structive notice standards and imputed liability through respon-
deat superior assume that there was no actual knowledge, and
therefore, no chance to voluntarily correct the violation. 9 ' Justice
O'Connor stated:
It would be unsound... to... permit substantial liability
without regard to the recipient's knowledge .... Where a
statute's express enforcement scheme hinges its most se-
vere sanction on notice and unsuccessful efforts to obtain
compliance, we cannot attribute to Congress the intention
to have implied an enforcement scheme that allows impo-
sition of greater liability without comparable condi-
tions. 
96
Justice O'Connor concluded that a "damages remedy will not lie
under Title IX unless an official who at a minimum has authority
to address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective
measures on the recipient's behalf has actual knowledge of dis-
crimination in the recipient's programs and fails adequately to
respond.""97
In Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education,'98 the Court had
the task of determining whether failure to stop student-on-student
harassment could be construed as a violation of Title IX.'99 Follow-
ing the guidelines set out in Gebser, the majority held that it could
be a violation."
The petitioner in Davis was the mother of a minor child,
LaShonda, who had been subjected to a "prolonged pattern of sex-
ual harassment by one of her fifth-grade classmates.""' Incidents
of harassment included explicit sexual comments, obscene actions
and gestures, and inappropriate and non-consensual touching."2
194. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 289.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 290.
198. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
199. Davis, 526 U.S. 629.
200. Id. at 633.
201. Id. at 634.
202. Id. at 634-45.
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LaShonda reported each of these incidents to a teacher, and her
mother followed up these incidents with phone calls to the school
principal."3 Petitioner alleged that despite this notice, the school
failed to discipline the harasser and made no effort to separate
him from LaShondaY4 As a result, LaShonda suffered emotional
difficulties, and her school performance dropped dramatically. °5
Davis filed suit, alleging that the school's failure to stop the har-
assment was a violation of Title IX, as it "interfered with
[LaShonda's] ability to attend school and perform her studies and
activities."2 6 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine
"whether and under what circumstances, a recipient of federal
educational funds can be liable in a private damages action aris-
ing from student-on-student sexual harassment."27 The majority
held that such a private damages action may lie against a school
board under Title IX, but only where the funding recipient acts
with deliberate indifference to the harassment. Additionally, the
harassment must be so severe that it effectively bars the victim's
access to an educational opportunity or benefit, and the funding
recipient exercises substantial control over both the harasser and
201the context in which the harassment occurs.
In Davis, the Court was asked to find not only that student-on-
student harassment was a prohibited behavior under Title IX but
also that a district's failure to respond to such behavior can sup-
port a private suit for monetary damages.0 9 While precedent ex-
isted to suggest that harassment constituted a form of discrimina-
tion under Title IX, and that a private money damages action ex-
isted,210 the respondents argued that under these rulings, a recipi-
ent can only be liable in damages for its own misconduct. 21" The
Court agreed with this, but maintained that the petitioner was
indeed seeking to hold the "Board liable for its own decision to re-
main idle in the face of known student-on-student harassment in
its schools."2"2 Further, the majority held that Gebser is entirely
203. Id. at 634.
204. Davis, 526 U.S. at 635.
205. Id. at 635-36.
206. Id. at 636.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 652-53.
209. Davis, 526 U.S. at 639.
210. See Gebser, 524 U.S. 274 (1998); Franklin, 50 U.S. 60 (1992); Cannon, 441 U.S. 677
(1979).
211. Davis, 526 U.S. at 640.
212. Id. at 641.
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applicable to the current case because the high standard of "delib-
erate indifference" sought to eliminate any risk that a recipient
would be held liable in damages for the independent (and un-
known) actions of its employees.213
Gebser established that an intentional violation of Title IX oc-
curs when a recipient is deliberately indifferent to known acts of
discrimination, and this violation may be remedied by an award of
214money damages. In Gebser, the harasser was a teacher, whereas
in Davis the Court was asked to extend liability when the ha-
rasser was another student."5 The Court did extend liability, but
with limitations."' The majority stated that Title IX's plain lan-
guage "confines the scope of prohibited conduct based on the re-
cipient's degree of control over the harasser and the environment
in which the harassment occurs."" 7 Further, the harassments
must occur "under the operations of' a funding recipient."21 The
Court asserted that these factors do limit liability, and only when
these factors are met can the recipient be said to "expose its stu-
dents to harassment or cause them to undergo it under the recipi-
ent's programs. " "' While these conditions may be satisfied most
easily when the harasser is an agent of the recipient, the Court
decided that the term "under" does not require agency.22 0
In Davis' case, the harassment occurred during school hours and
on school grounds; thus, it clearly took place under an operation of
the funding recipient.22 ' Further, as the offender was a student
and the violations took place at school, the school had substantial
control over the offender and the context in which the harassment
occurred.222 The school, its administrators and its attorneys were
all informed that student-on-student harassment could result in
liability under Title IX, and were certainly aware of the harass-
ment experienced by LaShonda.2"3 The majority held that should
213. Id. at 641-43.
214. Id. at 643. See also Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
215. Davis, 526 U.S. at 643. See also Gebser, 524 U.S. 274.
216. Davis, 526 U.S. at 643.
217. Id. at 644.
218. Id. at 645.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Davis, 526 U.S. at 646.
222. Id. ("We have observed ... 'that the nature [of the State's] power [over public school
children] is custodial and tutelary, permitting a degree of supervision and control that
could not be exercised over free adults.'") (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. at
655 (1995)).
223. Davis, 526 U.S. at 647.
766 Vol. 44
Summer 2006 Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education 767
their response be shown to have been "clearly unreasonable,"
Davis should prevail.224 As the Court had previously determined
that "sexual harassment" is "discrimination" under Title IX, 225 the
majority concluded that a private cause of action
may lie against the school board in cases of student-on-
student harassment... where the funding recipient acts
with deliberate indifference to known acts of harassment
in its programs or activities . . . for harassment that is so
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it effec-
tively bars the victim's access to an educational opportu-
nity or benefit.226
The Court's holding in Jackson is a logical extension of its past
interpretations of Title IX, and it is supported by the statute itself.
The dissent fundamentally misunderstood the broad reach of the
statute's terms. As former Senator Bayh noted in his amicus cu-
riae brief, "[t]he princip[a]l part of Title IX prohibits, in sweeping
terms, all acts of discrimination on the basis of sex against any
'person' by an educational institution in any education program...
that receives federal financial assistance."
227
The dissent would limit the statute in an impermissible fashion.
Under Title IX, "discrimination on the basis of sex" does not limit
the implied private action to causes of action stemming from the
plaintiffs sex. At the time of Title DC's adoption, Congress had
already recognized that retaliation on the basis of a complaint
about racial discrimination constituted a form of discrimination
prohibited under the civil rights statutes.2" Further, Congress
accepted that such discrimination could be challenged through an
implied right of action. It was against this backdrop and in this
spirit that Title IX was enacted. The Supreme Court's reliance on
and understanding of Sullivan as a guide to interpreting Title IX
was thus appropriate.
Justice Thomas also sought to compare Title IX to Title VII.
29
He placed much emphasis on the fact that Title VII specifically
224. Id. at 649.
225. See Gebser, 524 U.S. 274; Franklin, 503 U.S. 60.
226. Davis, 526 U.S. at 633.
227. Brief Amicus Curiae of Birch Bayh in Support of the Petitioner, Jackson, 544 U.S.
167 (No. 02-1672), 2004 WL 1881769, at *6. Senator Bayh was one of the prime sponsors
and architects of Title IX.
228. Sullivan, 396 U.S. 229.
229. Jackson, 544 U.S. at 186 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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includes a provision to address retaliation. However, Title IX was
modeled after Title V.I, a wholly different statute. Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 adopted an implementing regulation (not
a specific provision) which prohibited retaliation based on com-
plaints of illegal discrimination. This regulation was adopted at
the same time that Title IX was discussed and eventually adopted.
The Cannon Court accurately held that Title IX was meant to fol-
low Title VI, both in interpretation and in enforcement.
The ruling in Jackson was amply supported by Senator Bayh's
statements during floor debate over Title IX, during which he
clearly indicated "[t]he same [enforcement] procedure that was set
up and has operated with great success under the 1964 Civil
Rights Act ... would be equally applicable to discrimination [pro-
hibited by Title IX]. " '2 Therefore, the statute's silence on the is-
sue of retaliation is far from dispositive, as the circuit court in
Jackson held.
While the ultimate conclusion of the Supreme Court in Jackson
was correct and appropriate, further clarifications may be neces-
sary. The dissent raised an important concern: Will a retaliation
claim under Title IX actually require a plaintiff to prove that the
original, complained of, discrimination occurred? Such a limita-
tion on retaliation claims under Title IX should be a necessary
element for relief, and would serve as an important safeguard,
much as the actual notice requirement in sexual harassment cases
serves as a safeguard.
It is not disputed by the majority that Title IX contains a cause
of action for retaliation and that the sex of a plaintiff in such a
retaliation case should be of no consequence. However, as the pri-
vate right of action under Title IX is implied by the courts, certain
judicially imposed requirements are necessary to ensure the most
efficient remedy. Recipients who have not actually committed dis-
crimination prohibited by Title IX should not be liable for retalia-
tion against a plaintiff who complains of non-existent discrimina-
tion. This result would be nonsensical, resulting in economic
harm to recipients who are indeed complying with the terms of
and facilitating the goals of Title IX. Denying funding to recipi-
ents who are complying with the Title IX provisions would further
harm the students and employees of these compliant institutions.
Future cases should be careful to clarify limitations on the cause
230. Brief of Amicus Curiae of ]Birch Bayh in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 229,
at *9 n.5 (citing 117 CONG. REC. 3()408 (1971) (Sen. Bayh)).
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of action for retaliation, much as the Gebser and Davis Courts
clarified liability for sexual harassment.
Despite this caveat,
[t]he context in which Congress enacted Title IX in 1972
demonstrates clearly that (a) Congress intended to pro-
hibit all forms of discrimination in federally funded edu-
cational programs, including retaliation; (b) its intent is
especially clear with respect to prohibiting all forms of
discrimination in employment, .. . and (c) Congress in-
tended the private right of action under Title IX to extend
to such retaliation claims.23'
Provided the appropriate limitations are developed, Jackson will
serve to advance the original efforts of Title IX, and encourage
recipients to further equality in education.
Sarah M. Riley2
231. Id. at*11.
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